Jewish Reactions to the Nuremberg Laws (Part B) The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg Laws Source: A. Margaliot, “The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg Laws”, Yad Vashem Studies , Vol. 12, pp. 75 - 107 The Zionist Camp As far as the Zionists were concerned the Nuremberg Laws did not constitute a sudden blow, since its leaders had predicted a development of this kind long before. The platform which had been published at the beginning of the period of persecution , and which was published with minor alterations as "The Four-Point Plan," was appropriate to a situation of this nature, which they had foreseen as being inevitable sooner or later. 28 There were three main groups within the Zionist camp; the largest was "The German Zionist Federation" ( Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland - Z.V.f.D.), which comprised several trends, including the General Zionists (both A and B), the Labour Movement and Mizrachi . The opposition consisted of the Revisionists, who were united as "The Organisation of State Zionists" ( Staatszionistische Organisation ). The third group was the He-Halutz Movement, which maintained an independent framework and stand in spite of its close co-operation with the Z.V.f.D. Zionists of various groups did not hesitate to react publicly to the Nuremberg Laws. In fact, shortly after their publication, the Zionist organisations expressed their opinion in a series of articles in their organ Juedische Rundschau 29 , with passages from Adolf Hitler's speech in the Reichstag, as quoted in the introduction to the new laws. 'The German Government is guided by the thought that it might still be possible to find a separate, secular solution for building a basis upon which the German nation can adopt a better attitude towards the Jews.' 30 At roughly the same time an item of information was issued by the official German Press Agency ( Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero - D.N.B.), stating that Hitler had expressed his opposition to arbitrary acts of violence ( Einzelaktionen ), adding that the Nuremberg Laws made it possible for an independent national existence to be developed by the Jews in all spheres. The Zionist organ also quoted in full the interpretation given by A.I. Brandt, the director of the German Press Agency, stating, amongst other things, that: 'In the wake of the new laws... a defined situation has been created after years of conflict between Germans and Jews. This makes it palpably evident that the German nation has no objection to the Jews, provided they do not aspire to being anything more than Jews, and behave accordingly. On the other hand, however, the German nation refuses to regard the members of the Jewish nation as German citizens like themselves and to grant them the same rights and duties which devolve upon Germans.' 31 In the author's opinion, the sole purpose of the Nuremberg Laws was to declare the Jews a national minority: 'As a result of the new laws the Jewish minority will gain independent cultural life, a national life of its own... the German nation is convinced that the passing of these laws is both beneficial and regenerative for Judaism as well. By giving the Jewish minority an opportunity to lead its own life and assuring governmental support for this independent existence, Germany is helping Judaism to strengthen its national character and is making a contribution towards improved relations between the two peoples.' 32 The Juedische Rundschau published special editorials on this topic as well as citing passages from official sources concerning the government's intentions. 33 In the opinion of the Zionist leaders the Nuremberg Laws did not simply mark the close of an important chapter in the history of German Jewry, but also obliged them to institute a process of serious self-examination and to alter their way of life. Assimilation had taken its toll and the increase in the rate of intermarriage was threatening the future, but the blow, which the new laws represented, was to put an end to these phenomena. If the Jews were to maintain the partition between themselves and their environment it was to be hoped that, under the State's auspices, they could pursue an independent existence of their own on German soil. In this context it was noted that the law even allowed them to fly their national flag without hindrance. The Four-Point Plan of the Z.V.f.D. leaders defined the conditions, which they considered to be sine qua non . 34 The Jews had to be guaranteed: a. their material existence and the prevention of any damage to their honour b. the preservation of their heritage and the development of Jewish life c. education and vocational training d. regulated emigration during the coming years. The major stress was laid upon the development of autonomous Jewish life, namely, filling daily life with Jewish content, while at the same time creating the organisational tools needed for supplying material requirements. The Zionist leaders demanded that the educational system for Jewish children be expanded and that the activities of the existing sports association, theatre groups and orchestra be intensified. The institutions, which had been set up during the period of persecution, as well as the long-established network of community services, would be the tools for carrying out this task. In short, the leaders wanted to exploit the fact that Jews were being excluded from surrounding society to enhance Jewish creativity and strengthen their inner unity. This they regarded as the major challenge of their time. Thus far we have discussed in brief the initial reactions of the Zionist Federation to the Nuremberg Laws during the first few weeks after their publication. Although the attitude of the He-Halutz Centre was not substantially different from that of the leaders of the Z.V.f.D., it did not coincide with it on all points. The members of He-Halutz did not usually trouble over much about questions connected with institutions and internal arrangements of the community. 'Our purpose is education towards Zionist fulfilment and we do not concern ourselves with offices taking care of the affairs of the public as a whole, was written in a letter sent by one of its active members at that time. 35 Their attention was concentrated on preparing the youth, in ideological and practical terms, for immigration to Palestine. They made no attempt to solve the problems of the entire community, with its differing age groups and social strata, nor did they seek top positions in the community's central institutions or organisations. The Nuremberg Laws engendered a change in this line of thinking. The first report issued by the He-Halutz Centre after the publication of the laws contained an extensive analysis of the internal situation of German Jewry, culminating in a demand for immediate changes in the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) and the other public bodies 36 . The author of the review accused the assimilationists of gaining control of the community's institutions and of being insensitive to current trends. He also claimed that they had deliberately countered every attempt at reform, which could create an autonomous network of existence within Germany and encourage "constructive emigration." 37 In his view, it was essential that the number of Zionist representatives in the central organizations be increased. At the same time, the He-Hal Centre in Berlin decided that one of its senior members, Georg Josephtal, should be instructed to participate in the National Representation (Reichsvertretng) . All those involved agreed to increase the number of Zionists in the presidium of the Representation 38 . The twenty-five year old Josephtal brought a breath of new life into the ranks of elderly and respectable dignitaries. The He-Halutz Centre simultaneously demanded that a proposal for the settlement of the Jewish question be submitted to the German Government. 39 The idea that a systematic and continuous flow of emigration would lead to the disappearance of Germany's Jewish communities within fifteen to twenty years was at the base of the plan. The He-Halutz leaders assumed that this underlying goal would prove so alluring to the German authorities that they would agree to extend aid towards further emigration by liberalising the laws governing the transfer of foreign currency abroad, by providing opportunities for vocational training and by "political means," t he nature of which were not defined in the report. 40 The government would also have to acknowledge the fact that the implementation of this plan hinged on the guarantee of adequate economic rights for German Jews until they left the country, since a shattered and impoverished Jewish community would not be capable of organising an extensive emigration movement. Although this plan did not include any revolutionary ideas, it should be noted that the He-Halutz Centre in Berlin really did believe that the time was ripe for negotiations with the German Government. The National Representation (Reichsvertretung), as well as the other Jewish associations, with the sole exception of the Organisation of State Zionists, did not think that this was the case. The previous attempt at negotiations between the central Jewish institutions and the authorities, in January 1934, had proved fruitless 41 . The government's failure to respond to the Jewish organisations' request had demonstrated that there was no point in making another attempt. The He-Halutz leaders, on the other hand, regarded the Reichstag's resolutions at Nuremberg as an indication that the conditions for conducting negotiations with the government concerning an overall agreement on the Jewish question now existed. The reaction of the Organisation of State Zionists to the Nuremberg Laws was not surprising in its content, although its form was unusual. The interview with Georg Kareski, head of the Organisation, published in Der Angriff , the well-known National Socialist newspaper, caused a sensation throughout the Jewish world. Der Angriff , which was connected with Joseph Goebbels and was notorious for its virulent anti-Semitism, published a lengthy article entitled "Stringent Separation Highly Desirable" in its issue of 23.12.1935 42 . Oskar Liskowski, who interviewed Kareski for the newspaper, asked for his opinion of the Nuremberg Laws, commenting that it was "well-known" that their object was to lay the foundation of a solution to the Jewish problem and to create better relations between the German and Jewish nations. In his reply, the head of the Organisation of State Zionists expressed his approval of separation between Germans and Jews, adding that he was referring to a relationship, which involved mutual respect. Kareski did not conceal the fact that his approval of the principle of dissociation did not extend to the restrictions on civil rights invoked by the new legislation. Kareski condemned the phenomena of assimilation and mixed marriage, and emphasised the necessity of expanding the Jews' cultural activities and preserving their unique collective character. The wider Jewish public regarded the interview as degrading, taking it to signify approval of the German Government's policy towards the Jews. It was claimed that Kareski intended to remove the Jews from society with his own hands and to undermine their status within it. However, one fact was ignored: he had taken pains to emphasise the need for German-Jewish relations based on mutual respect, expressing his reservations concerning the racist laws, which damaged the status of the Jews as German citizens. During this period the Organisation of State Zionists published a statement the content of which was far more important than the interview described in the foregoing paragraphs. 43 The statement made it clear that the Nuremberg Laws had destroyed the assimilationists' illusions once and for all, vindicating the Zionists' contention that the Jews constituted a national minority within Germany. But the State Zionists who held this view were also concerned about the government's intentions as reflected in the new legislation, and particularly about the loss of equal rights. There could be no doubt that the publication of the laws had helped to clarify the position, establishing a clear-cut legal situation. 'As a result, the sense of uncertainty..., which prevailed in many Jewish circles has vanished. The Jews have lost the legal status of equality, but at least henceforth they stand on a firm legal basis'. 44 It was claimed that the Head of State's words should be welcomed, as should the interpretation put on them by the German Press Agency, namely, that the German Jews would accordingly be allowed to develop their own national character under the aegis of the government. September 15, 1935 should be regarded as a turning point in the life of German Jewry, leading to a fundamental change in its attitudes and management. In accordance with this the assimilationists should be removed from key positions and a "Provisional National Councils" ( Provisorischer Volksrat ) should be established 45 . This public statement marked a change, even if only a temporary one, in the attitude of the Organisation of State Zionists. This shift touched upon two areas: whereas in the summer of 1935 the leaders of the Organisation had submitted a plan for the gradual evacuation of all of Germany's Jews, this was altered in the light of the official interpretation put on the Nuremberg Laws 46. The terms "emigration and removal" no longer served as the basis for the solution of the problem, being replaced by an arrangement founded on granting minority status to the Jewish community in Germany 47. The members of the Organisation thus returned temporarily to their former stand 48, viz. that the equal rights granted to the Jew as an individual should be replaced by an arrangement under, which Jews as a group would have collective rights, as per the law of minorities accepted throughout the world. 49 A parallel modification in their demand for the establishment of a new leadership was also noted. A few days before the publication of the Nuremberg Laws, the heads of the Organisation of State Zionists had applied to the German Foreign Ministry; requesting the appointment of an Emigration Commissar ( Auswanderungskommissar ) responsible for implementing the general exodus of the community. 50 Now, however, they proposed the establishment of a Provisional National Council, which would guarantee the rights of the Jews in Germany. It should be noted that at that time the Z.V.f.D. also believed that the government intended to accord the Jews the status of a national minority 51 . A few days after the publication of the Nuremberg Laws a Zionist meeting was held in Berlin with the participation of Benno Cohen and Joachim Prinz. These two men, who were among the leaders of the movement, reviewed recent developments and outlined a plan for the emigration of German Jews to Palestine during the ensuing five years. On the basis of their proposal, 15,000 persons would emigrate each year, and at the end of this period the total number of immigrants would be 75,000. At the same time, they cautioned against advocating mass emigration, which might spell the end of German Jewry 52 . Was this indicative of the attitude adopted by the Zionist Federation as a whole and of the trend of its planning and activity for the future? The emigration question obviously exercised the members of the movement and the problem became more and more acute as increasing numbers of individuals who had completed vocational training found themselves waiting for a considerable length of time for immigration certificates which did not materialise. Joachim Prinz, who complained bitterly about this, voiced the feelings of dismay felt by so many. 53 It was in this atmosphere that the Convention of Z.V.f.D. delegates, the last to take place on German soil before the Holocaust, was held in Berlin at the beginning of 1936. Although the emigration problem occupied a prominent position, it was not the only topic on the agenda. A good part of the lectures and discussions centred upon such matters as internal organisation, cultural activities, the Jewish schools, the budget and the fund-raising caof the Keren Hayesod . Nonetheless, the calibre of the men chosen to discuss the emigration question and the extensive nature of the debates on this subject underlined its importance. Some of the statements made by the movement's leaders at the Berlin Convention and a selection of the resolutions passed are given below. Siegfried Moses, the Chairman of the Z.V.f.D., declared: 'The central institutions and the communities must adopt the concept of emigration as the point of departure for all the activities'. Adding that the educational system, the study program, the vocational training institutes and all other instruments, which could aid in achieving this, should be adapted accordingly. 54 He stated explicitly that for him this was the most important task. The resolutions passed at the conclusion of the Convention are also in this vein, containing such statements as: 'German Jewry, and in particular its youth, is primarily being directed along the wanderer's path.' 55 The leaders distinguished between immigration to Palestine and to other countries. Although, they contended, their attitude to both was positive, they demanded that primacy be accorded to Palestine, since it constituted the basis for the existence of the Jewish nation as a whole and was not merely a refuge for the individual in his hour of need. The dispersion of emigration into many different directions would not solve the Jewish question, but would merely transfer its focal points to new places 56 . Most of the speakers praised the large-scale efforts, which had led to the emigration to Palestine of 30,000 German Jews since 1933. Siegfried Moses maintained that the magnitude of this campaign should not be measured on a quantitative scale alone. He claimed that the quality of the immigrants was the deciding element in evaluating the significance of the achievement. Because of their age, abilities and training these immigrants would participate in the efforts of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) to build the national home, and this, he maintained, was the main point 57 . Various speakers presented reports assessing ways of absorbing immigrants, various types of settlement and the finances necessary, but did not present a working plan and refrained from clarifying how they would operate with regard to the pace and extent of emigration in the future. There were two reasons for this vacillation, which were not fully known to the public at large. The first is evident from a secret document drawn up at the end of 1935 and in, which it was stated that, 'the situation regarding the transfer is disastrous?' 58 Dr. Werner Feilchenfeld, Director of the "Transfer" Institution, noted that whereas Jewish property amounting to 27.3 million marks had been transferred to Palestine between November 1, 1933 and December 31, 1935, by the end of this period more than double this sum had accumulated, and nobody knew when it would be possible to transfer it to Palestine. 59 He also claimed that if the system of transferring funds was not changed in the near future it would be necessary to make a public announcement to the effect that property-owners would no longer emigrate from Germany. The second reason was the restriction in the number of immigration certificates issued by the Mandatory Government. This aspect of British policy had aroused the ire of Jews throughout the world and was also opposed by the delegates to the Berlin Convention, though in a more restrained tone 60 . References: 28 Juedische Rundschau, 5.3.1934, 30.11.1934 (hereafter – J.R.). 29.J.R., September 17, 1935. 30. Ibid. ; and compare the text of the speech in Max Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen . 1932–1945, Vol. 2, Munich, 1965, p. 537; see also the interview with Hitler of November 28, 1935, by the American journalist Baillie, in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1922–1923 , N. H. Baynes (ed.), Vol. 1, London, 1942, pp. 732–734. 31. Ibid. 32.Ibid. 33.J.R., 17.9., 24.9., and 27.9.1935. 34.J.R., 17.9 and 24.9.1935. 35.A Report of He-Halutz Centre in Berlin, February 4, 1935, Archives of the Labour Federation Executive (hereafter – LFEA); Germany emissaries files. 36.Yitzhak Ben Aharon to the Labour Federation Executive in Palestine, September 19, 1935, LFEA, Germany emissaries files. 37. Ibid. 38.See JTA (Jewish Telegraphic Agency), November 10, 1935, Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem (hereafter – ALBI); Section Reichsvertretung – “C”. 39. He-Halutz Report, LFEA. 40. Ibid. 41.GFOC, Neue Reichskanzlei, Juedische Angelegenheiten, 16.1.1934, YVA, JM/2461. 42. Der Angriff , No. 299, 23.12.1935; the interview with Kareski took place as early as October 2, 1935. 43.The manifesto was published in stencil and undated (hereafter – Kundgebung ), Kareski's bequest, Ramat Gan. 44. Ibid. , “sodass das... Gefuehl der Rechtsunsicherheit... verschwinden darf. Die Rechtsgleichheit haben die Juden in Deutschland verloren, aber sie haben wenigstens wieder einen Rechtsboden unter den Fuessen.” 45.Compare Y. Ben Aharon's report of September 19, 1935 to the Labour Federation Executive about Kareski's intention to establish a Nationalrat . In a later report of December 8, 1935, it was mentioned that Georg Kareski was in contact with Rudolf Hess, but no clear connection is drawn with Kareski's plan of establishing a “National Council”; LFEA, Germany emissaries files. 46. Der Staatszionist , 31.3.1935 (special issue). 47. Ibid. 48.Der Staatszionist , 20.1.1934, p. 4. See another article under the title “Warum nicht Minderheitenrecht?” ibid., 3.1.1934. 49. Kundgebung, ibid. Compare Der Staatszionist , 3.3.1935. According to their views it would be possible in the wake of the Nuremberg Laws to substitute civil rights of the individual for collective rights of a minority group. 50. Der Staatszionist , 25.8.1935; compare Max Schulmann's application of 11.9.1935 on the same subject to the German Foreign Office, CBFA, YVA, JM/2245 (K–1506). 51.Kurt Loewenstein at the Zionist Convention in Berlin, J.R., 4.2.1936, p. 5. 52.J.R., 24.9.1935, p. 3. 53. Ibid. , p. 5. 54. Ibid. , p. 2. 55. Ibid. , p. 7. 56. Ibid. , p. 2. 57. Ibid. 58. Werner Feilchenfeld, Das bisherige Ergebnis der Auswanderung und Vorschlaege fuer eine Verbesserung der Auswanderung, 13.2.1936, CZA, S 25/9713. 59.According to the “National Representation (Reichsvertretung) ” Report of January 28, 1936, the sum was 26 million Reichsmark (RM): Eingabe der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland betreffend Foerderung der Auswanderung von Juden aus Deutschland (hereafter – Eingabe R.V.), CZA, S 25/9810; according to another report of the Zionist institutions (undated), 24.5 million RM were transferred to Palestine by the end of 1925, CZA, S 7–01. 60.J.R., 7.2.1936, p. 7.